The Moral Given: How Moral Superiority Displaces Agency (part 1)
I hate nothing quite like the leftist who takes for granted all the work that others had to do to make things so straightforward for them. If not for the tireless work of activists, whom history does not remember, we would continue to label the pains of unwelcome sexual advances as a personal failure.
intro
It's easy to judge the past based on self-evident injustices, but consider the impact of the second feminist wave for a moment: would sexual harassment and marital rape be obvious injustices for us without the women who struggled through decades of organizing to advocate for themselves?
The example originates from Miranda Fricker's 2007 book Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing. In it, she expresses concern over how social structures and identities shape whose knowledge is recognized and whose experiences are rendered unintelligible even to themselves1.
The vocabularies, framings, and narratives that allow us to understand, communicate, and navigate reality are collective and definite. These interpretive devices condition how and what experiences are intelligible to us, and their limited nature inevitably leads to problematic situations. A person who has been harmed might be unable to conceptualize that they have been treated unjustly, or the sheer intangibility of another person's account makes it difficult to regard them as a credible victim, even when one has no prejudice against them.
There was no established concept for 'sexual workplace harassment' before the 70s, and it took decades of advocate work for western courts to recognize and criminalize it. Without societally prevalent frameworks for articulating the injustice, unwanted sexual attention tended to be understood as a personal failure even by the victims themselves. One wondered whether they had misread the situation or failed to handle it properly, and victims often even felt that they had encouraged the behavior that would later be identified as harassment. Negative reactions to seemingly innocent situations were consistently characterized as a deficit of the victim. In other words, systemic issues were treated in isolation as the problem was personalized.
If the intelligibility of harm can itself depend on limited and socially situated resources, meaning that harm is not always immediately apprehensible to those who experience it, it is dubious whether we can reliably advocate for something without reckoning with the fact that our own outlook on the matter is not fixed. If we assume that the injustices we advocate for are self-evident, don't we end up treating our own account as exhaustive, thereby risking dismissing other relevant injustices or even speaking over the very people we take ourselves to represent? Conversely, could this assumption be instrumental in some manner, even if it carries risks? Assuming that it doesn't, I'd still argue that advocate workers who treat their morals as self-evident miss more than just the fact that the victims had to first articulate their experiences among themselves to make advocacy possible.
Advocacy is arguably the most common and, broadly speaking, the most visible form of activism. It includes all manner of practices that concern public support or political representation of a particular cause, group, proposal, or position with the aim of influencing policy, collective opinion, and collective action. Being a prominent tool for social change, activists are frequently in contact with people whose beliefs contradict their own. A common sentiment they face is that activism itself has little power over its circumstances, which, in the form of a concern or grievance, doesn't seem to be uncommon among self-identified leftists?2
This begs the question: what constitutes a "win"? Is a movement successful when it mobilizes people en mass? Does it require legislative change and is its raison d'être the eradication of an injustice? How does "material", or real change differ from imaginary?
While criticisms that concern unaddressed root-problems should not be dismissed, when these shortcomings are used to characterize activism as a whole, they amount to little else than a tautology. People Power protestors, late 20th century South African liberation fighters, and 60s Civil Rights advocates were once considered to be all manner of disruptive agitators, violent militants, and rebellious idealists---only to be retroactively defined as valid social movements by the material results they produced.
But what about feminists? The movement has been demonstrably successful in influencing both policy and ethics, yet feminism is not treated with the same general prestige as some of the other successful movements. While the Civil Rights movement is commonly identified as a matter of a gone era --even when civil-rights activism continues to this day--, the feminist identity seems to have an unusually persistent continuity. Contrary to many other historical movements, it is narrated as an ongoing process consisting of "waves", directly connecting contemporary activists to their predecessors.
There's some manner of tension between the feminist identity and its achievements. It is as if it no longer makes sense to associate the many self-evident principles (which were once distinctly feminist demands) with the movement itself, making its achievements easy to overlook.
I think that the matter has less to do with feminism and more with the structural position of transformative action itself. There's a measurable gap between how historical movements and their successors are received by the general public, with the latter being polarizing in a manner comparable to feminism3. As conditioned by the clash of the movement's content with the prevailing order --inseparably cultural, institutional, and structural--, the form and severity of hostilities suffered by different causes varies greatly. Yet a general theme emerges, and the interesting aspect about feminism remaining identifiable as a historical movement is how the tension between its continuity and effacement can be used to elucidate something important about the general erasure of activist agency.
Activism is always preceded by local epistemic struggles and must go against the current to change society. Would there be a need to mobilize against injustices that are legible, legitimate, and dealt with on an institutional level? It's not just that feminism is misrepresented but that concurrent activism must be denied of the retrospective righteousness society affords to social movements that "were" able to materialize their morality.
As many of us can attest to, successful campaigns often end up being misrepresented, with all the grime and muck filtered from their historical account. If not dismissed as self-evident or narrated as an outcome of some autonomous process --be it history, nature, morality, or the divine-- the very authorities who caved to demands also tend to get the credit (just look into Henry Ford and the 40-hour workweek).
This isn't to imply that successful movements face an attribution problem; we shouldn't aim at having our names canonized in the first place. "That's how the system gets you, you trade your social movement for the history book." 4 The point is that becoming part of the mainstream is not a sign of defeat by default.
Legitimating an injustice requires us to transform the dominant forms of discourse, meaning that a movement must construct its own language to challenge the status quo. This entails that advocacy depends on the appropriation of its culture, in a manner of speaking. It also follows that we are unable to immediately distinguish a loss from a win based on whether or not we have been "co-opted." Moreover, the clear-cut case of feminist demands being assimilated as a given (as it coincides with the erasure of their agency) can itself serve as a marker for a turning point we should all strife for: the aim of any social movement is to vanish into its tautology. In other words, it's a major victory when the public no longer needs to identify with a label to ascribe to our values.
The public might think that activism is pointless but your morality is itself proof of how powerful social movements can be. Activism works; we are responsible even for our morality.
This seems to reframe the earlier question about win conditions. If successful social movements inform morality, meaning that we can't distinguish between values made right by their victory and a victory made right by the values, what can we ground our moral authority on, and how can we feel justified in acting against the status quo?
Should we brush off this inquiry and, therefore, what our morality presumes, would we not also lose the ability to critically assess our behavior? Case in point: besides it being doubtful that we can stop feeding into the prevalent political cynicism5 and capitalist realism6 while treating our morality as fixed, we may end up undermining our own power by further obscuring the work of the people who came before us.
Rather than assessing the practices associated with our morality, movement, and transformative action in general, we end up repeatedly performing them as a given. It is deceptively easy to reproduce the routines of our predecessors while ignoring the work that it took for them to discern which practices should be avoided and arrive at judgments that are appropriate within their own context.
Whether we are referring to the effaced work of our predecessors or the routines that produce our social body, one has to understand the importance of analyzing the 'labor' 7, or the material presumptions of our position. Otherwise we may miss that our supposedly voluntarist group depends on coerced labor, or how our own fanaticism towards a thinker or an idea makes us repel others, often without basing our judgment on the very methods we praise as the one and only means of social transformation.
This article belongs to a collection of texts that seek to rearticulate what authority is while advocating for a post-structuralist flavored, 21st century sociopolitical egoism. The topic of standards will be more thoroughly addressed at a later date. The purpose of my next few posts is to elucidate on "egoism" and to make a case as to why a theory for 'common sense' (or how things obtain as self-evident) is mandatory for effective advocacy work, while also serving to challenge the intuition that we can reliably advocate for something without shifting our focus from whether our position is correct to how our practices situate themselves within the context of their application.
edit 1 (11.10.26): changes in form and minor ones in grammar: added footnotes and included two new sections with the intent of making the general idea of concepts being temporal clearer, as well as explicitly mentioning "material presumptions" (and 'labor') in the intro.
While we will be utilizing Fricker's account in how it complicates the assumption that harm must be immediately apprehensible to those who experience it (for now), it should be made clear that her case is much more specific than that. Briefly, she focuses on how marginalized individuals are systematically wronged in their capacity as a knower.↩
The question mark is meant to imply an anecdotal take. (One should expect similar breaks in established grammar in the future.)↩
Sticking to US based examples, an Ipsos poll (Jan. 11th - 15th, 2019) found a 90% favorability rating for MLK among U.S. adults, with 70% saying that the movement made the country better. Only 39% said that BLM has made things better (with 31% saying that it has made things worse.) See also the Pew Research Center analysis (Aug. 10th, 2023) about how public views of MLK have changed since the 60s. Similarly, there's a clear separation between agreement with feminist principles and a willingness to identify with the label, as can be seen in the Pew Research Center surveys done during the 100th anniversary of women's voting rights. (Mar. 18th - Apr. 1st, 2020: "A Century After Women Gained the Right To Vote, Majority of Americans See Work To Do on Gender Equality"; "61% of U.S. women say ‘feminist’ describes them well; many see feminism as empowering, polarizing.")↩
A special thanks to the people who contributed to the text (largely by listening to me babble endlessly about the topic.) I want to especially mention Francesca and Chemical Rose (quoted), as well as Kaapo, Rane, Gigil, Venus, and "lähimetsän pöllö."↩
As characterized by the late Mark Fisher, 'capitalist realism' concerns our lost ability to imagine feasible alternatives to capitalism. While Fisher's point was more about the absence of coherent alternatives than with our collective inability to imagine capitalism's end without the world itself ending, the idea is still perhaps best demonstrated by the increasing presence of (post-)apocalyptic scenarios in genre fiction.↩
I'd characterize 'political cynicism' as a kind of negative realism, in which the apparent non-action itself plays into the reproduction of the system as such.↩
I want to pre-emptively state that I don't use the term in context of a social totality in the same manner that Marxists do, for whom 'labor' entails the human activity presumed by the capitalist social body. Compare these structural notions with how the colloquial use of 'work' doesn't really distinguish between the labor that the given social body depends on from any other kind of productive or paid human activity. (Many would refer to streaming your life online as "work", as long as it was a major source of income.)↩